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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXX

Railway Labor Act - Carrier's Right To Resort To
Self-Help In Major Disputes Prior To The
Exhaustion Of RLA Procedures
National Airlines, Inc. v. InternationalAssociation of Machinists1
When a system of transportation suddenly and unexpectedly ceases
to provide service because of a labor dispute in the transportation industry, the ramifications can be disastrous. The effect of such labor
strife is rarely limited to the disputing parties and often extends to a
vast number of people, industries and labor markets and may spiral
into a problem of national magnitude. A strike in one state often paralyzes transportation in an entire section of the country, resulting in
passenger inconvenience, mail service slowdowns, work stoppages and
a general interruption of commerce. 2 Realizing that effective methods
of mobilizing people and goods are essential to the national welfare,
Congress in 1926 enacted the Railway Labor Act' as an attempt to
keep the lines of transportation open and moving during times of labormanagement conflict.4 Although the RLA has brought a relative degree of industrial peace to the transportation industry, it nevertheless
has some serious shortcomings, not the least of which is the failure to
provide a statutory mechanism for the continuance of carrier operations
during wildcat strikes.5 This deficiency often presents grave problems,
especially when a major work stoppage occurs and 'the RLA machinery
proves ineffective in alleviating it.
Such a situation is presented in National Airlines, Inc. v. International Association of Machinists.6 On October 31, 1968, National
and the Machinists' Union exchanged section 6' notices of intended
changes in their collective bargaining agreement, thus instituting the
elaborate procedure of negotiation established by the Act. While the
1. 416 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
2. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
381 (1969).
3. Ch. 347, § 14, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as RLA or Act]. Air carriers and their employees were made
subject to the RLA in 1936. Railway Labor Act ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), as
amended 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1964).
4. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1964) delineates the general purpose of the RLA as follows:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier
engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among
employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right
of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry
out the purposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions;
(5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out
of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements
covering
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
5. See Maclntyre, The Railway Labor Act -

A Misfit for the Airlines, 19 J.

AnR L. & Com. 274, 285-88 (1952), where it is suggested that airlines be removed
from the jurisdiction of the RLA and placed under the "dominant labor law of the
land" and that a remedial forum be established to supervise the activities between
labor and management in the airline industry.
6. 416 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
7. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964). These are the notices required to institute changes in
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. See note 32 infra.
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procedures were in progress, National ordered that the number of men
needed to taxi an aircraft be reduced from three to two. Three of the
union workers refused to follow the order, believing the reduction to
have created unsafe working conditions. National promptly suspended
the three workers, an action which immediately precipitated a wildcat
strike by the union at National's Kennedy Airport and Miami International facilities.
National obtained an injunction against the union since the strike
violated the status quo 8 provisions of the Act and also breached the
collective bargaining agreement. In response to these measures, the
union obtained a temporary restraining order requiring National to
employ three workers to taxi aircraft.' Although National complied
with the taxi dispute order, the workers failed to return to their jobs.
Union officials admitted that they had lost control over their members.
Thereafter, National sought and received from the district court a
second injunction ordering the men to return to work. This second
order also provided that the workers be notified that, upon failure to
return to work, they would be subject to penalties which could include
dismissal by National. When the strikers did not report to work the
next day, National discharged approximately 940 Union workers.
The court of appeals modified the discharge, ordering that those
workers whose positions were filled by National, either at the time of
the discharge or before the time the strike would have run its course,
would not be entitled to reinstatement; but that those strikers whose
jobs had not been filled when the strike ended would be entitled to
reinstatement. Of importance is the court's answer to the question of
whether a carrier may resort to self-help in a major dispute before
the statutory procedures of the RLA have been exhausted. In recognizing that, under the circumstances of this case, a carrier has at least
a limited right to self-help prior to the exhausting of its statutory
remedies, the court made a novel though compelling departure from
prior case law.
The paramount objectives of the RLA are to avoid any interruptions in or interference with interstate commerce' ° and to promote the
8. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
9. The temporary restraining order was changed to a preliminary injunction
directing National to taxi with at least three men until the procedures of the Act had

been exhausted. In sustaining the union's position in the taxi dispute, the district
court held that National violated the status quo by changing the number of men required to taxi an aircraft after the procedures of the Act were set in motion by the
§ 6 notices on October 31, 1968. It is interesting to note that the district court upheld
the use of a three man taxi team despite the fact there was no substantial issue of
safety involved in the use of the two man team. In fact, it recognized that the almost
unanimous practice throughout the airline industry is to use two men to taxi airplanes.
But the court's paramount consideration was that a unilateral change had been instituted by the carrier during a freeze period when such modifications of the status quo
are barred. See note 32 infra. Consequently, after it was found that the change in
the taxi team number altered the status quo, the merits of the change became irrelevant,
since the change per se violated the status quo. National Airlines, Inc. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, 303 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
10. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1964); see, e.g., Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943), where Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
The national interest expressed by [the RLA] is not primarily in the working
conditions as such. So far as the Act itself is concerned these conditions may be
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continuance of the employer's operations and the employee-employer
relationship."' The Act does not undertake governmental regulation
of wages, hours or working conditions, nor does it authorize anyone
to set applicable standards. 12 Basically, the RLA provides for the selfadjustment of labor problems in the transportation industries 8 through
a non-judicial process of conciliation, mediation and arbitration.1 4 It
seeks to avoid strikes"5 and attempts to foster the prompt and orderly
settlement of all grievances and disputes, 6 leaving a minimum of
responsibility to the courts.' 7
The procedure used for settling a dispute under the Act varies,
depending on whether the labor-management conflict is classified as
major or minor.' 8 The latter involves disputes over the interpretation
as bad as the employees will tolerate or be made as good as they can bargain
for. . . . The federal interest that is fostered is to see that disagreement about
conditions does not reach the point of interfering with interstate commerce. The
Mediation Board and Adjustment Board act to compose differences that threaten
continuity of work, not to remove conditions that threaten the health or safety
of workers.
11. United Indus. Workers of Seafarers v. Board of Trustees, 400 F.2d 320,
329-30 (5th Cir. 1968), where the court said in comparing the RLA to the NLRA:
On the other hand, the Railway Labor Act is more concerned than the National
Labor Relations Act with the continuance of the employer's operations and the
employer-employee relationship. This is evidenced by the fact that while bargaining is the first and last step under the NLRA, it is only the first step under
the Railway Labor Act in a ladder that leads to the White House if differences
cannot be resolved.
Consider also that although the NLRA has been referred to in construing
the RLA, see, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1944), the
Supreme Court has warned that the former "cannot be imported wholesale into the
railway labor arena. Even rough analogies must be drawn circumspectly, with due
regard for the many differences between the statutory schemes." Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969).
12. E.g., Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6

(1942).

13.
A primary purpose of the major revisions made in 1934 was to strengthen
the position of labor organizations zis-a-vis the carriers, to the end of furthering
the success of the basic congressional policy of self-adjustment of the industry's
labor problems between carrier organizations and effective labor organizations.
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 759 (1961).
14. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S.
50, 58 (1944).
15. "The Railway Labor Act was designed, not to outlaw the right to strike,
but merely to prevent the necessity for its exercise." Washington Terminal Co. v.
Boswell, 124 F.2d 235, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
16. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1964); see. e.g., Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d
768, 770 (5th Cir. 1937).
17.
In view of the pattern of this legislation and its history the command of the
Act should be explicit and the purpose to afford a judicial remedy plain before an
obligation enforceable in the courts should be implied. Unless that test is met the
assumption must be that Congress fashioned a remedy available only in other
tribunals. There may be as a result many areas in this field where neither the
administrative nor the judicial function can be utilized. But that is only to be
expected where Congress still places such great reliance on the voluntary process
of conciliation, mediation and arbitration.
See H. RiP. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. Courts should not rush in where
Congress had not chosen to tread. General Comm. v. Missouri-K.-T.R.R., 320 U.S.
323, 337 (1943).
18. The major-minor dispute distinction was first made by Justice Rutledge in
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945) :
The first [major] relates to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or
where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not
whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look to the
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and application of existing agreements, whereas the former involves
controversies over changes in existing agreements or the creation of
new agreements. Under either type, the Act stipulates that the first
step the parties must take is to "...
exert every reasonable effort to
make and maintain agreements .
and to settle . . . disputes. ...

If these attempts at settlement prove fruitless, then the parties must
adhere to the methods provided by the Act.
Since minor disputes arise primarily over conflicts in the interpretation of existing agreements, they were not, in the judgment of
Congress, of sufficient importance to justify a strike in a transportation
industry with a consequent interruption of interstate commerce.20 Thus,
if negotiations and conferences between the parties fail to bring an
agreement, either party may refer the controversy to an adjustment
board which determines the conflict and makes appropriate awards
which are final and binding upon both parties. 2 1 Since a strike is inconsistent with the aim of resolving minor disputes through binding arbitration, a union cannot lawfully resort to such measures; and if a
strike should occur it can be enjoined to preserve the procedures of
the RLA.2 2 On the other hand, courts generally have denied injuncacquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have
vested in the past.

The second class [minor], however, contemplates the existence of a collective
agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is
made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one. The dispute
relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with
reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. In the latter event the
claim is founded upon some incident of the employment relation, or asserted one,
independent of those covered by the collective agreement, e.g., claims on account
of personal injuries. In either case the claim is to rights accrued, not merely to
have new ones created for the future.
In general the difference is between what are regarded traditionally as the
major and the minor disputes of the railway labor world... . (emphasis added).
While the distinction seems relatively simple, its practical application often proves
confusing. See Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo in
Railway Labor Disputes, 60 COLUM. L. Rev. 381, 396 (1960), for an assessment of
the utility of the major-minor classification as it has been employed by the courts.
This comment also criticizes the apparent ability of either party to manipulate the
classification of a dispute for its particular purposes thus making it increasingly
difficult to rely on the major-minor distinction as an aid to the judicial handling of
railway labor disputes. Note, Labor Law - Railway Labor Act - Major and Minor
Disputes, 31 J.Anz L. & Com. 371 (1965), discusses the difficulty in defining the
differences in major and minor disputes when applied to specific fact situations. See
generally Harper, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J.Anx L. &
Com. 3 (1969) ; Wisehart, The Airlines' Recent Experience Under the Railway Labor
Act, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 22, 27-33 (1960).

In National, classification of the

taxi dispute as major or minor was unnecessary, however, since the discharge occurred
during the freeze period following the exchange of section 6 notices. See note 32 infra.
19. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
20. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 404 F.2d 80, 82
(7th Cir. 1968).
21. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
22. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
In this case there was a conflict between the RLA, which supported the issuance of
injunctions to uphold its minor dispute provisions, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch.
90, §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964), which withdrew from federal courts the power to issue injunctions in labor disputes. Chief Justice
Warren resolved the discrepancy by holding that the two Acts must be read together
as a pattern of labor legislation and that the more specific provisions of the RLA
would then take priority over the general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXX

tive relief against a carrier since it is not bound by any specific duty
under the RLA to maintain the status quo in a minor dispute. 2
Unlike minor disputes where the process of negotiation must culminate in a final and binding decision, major disputes are not subject
to a dictated settlement.2 4 There is no compulsion on the parties to
agree at any stage of the procedure.2 5 But, "[wihile agreement is not
compulsory, the steps required by the Act are."2 " The RLA "imposes
a mandatory duty upon both carrier and union to follow its proce2
dures." T
The detailed framework of the RLA which facilitates the voluntary settlement of major disputes has recently been outlined by the
Supreme Court:
A party desiring to effect a change of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. § 6. The parties
must confer, § 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the
dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National
Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte
if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation
fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the
controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place, however,
only if both consent. §§ 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and
the dispute threatens "substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of
essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify
the President," who may create an emergency board to investigate
and report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working its
way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the
status quo. §§ 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10.21
These procedures are ".

.

. purposely long and drawn out, based

on the hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in
time an agreement that resolves the dispute. '29 To preserve the status
quo and to prevent circumvention of the Act's processes, there are several "freeze" 80 or "cooling-off" 8' provisions incorporated in the RLA
23. See Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo in Railway
Labor Disputes, 60 COLUM. L. Rgv. 381, 391 (1960), and cases cited therein.
24. See, e.g., Harper, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act. 35 J. An'
L. & Com. 3, 8 (1969).
25. American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 169 F. Supp. 777, 784
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).

26. Id. at 787.
27. Id.
28. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
378 (1969) (emphasis added).
29. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238,

246 (1966).
30. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61, 66 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936 (1962).
31. 67 CoNG. Ric. 4648, 4650 (1928).
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which extend through the entire major dispute proceedings.3 2 Notwithstanding the mandates of the Norris La-Guardia Act that injunctions
in labor disputes shall not issue,3 3 these freeze provisions consistently
34
have been held enforceable by the courts.
The purpose of this section, as one court has stated, "was to
prevent rocking of the boat by either side until the procedures of the
Railway Labor Act were exhausted. '8' 5 Its function is to stabilize relations by artificially extending the lives of agreements for a limited
period regardless of the intentions of the parties.86 During the course
32. The "freeze" or "status quo" provisions are found in 45 U.S.C. §§ 156, 155
and 160. Section 156 reads:
Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days'
written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference
between the representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall
be agreed upon within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time
shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such
notice of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held with
reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by
either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has
been finally acted upon, as required by section 155 of this title, by the Mediation
Board. unless a period of ten days has lapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board (emphasis added).
Section 155 stipulates that if mediation is undertaken by the National Mediation Board
and notice is given to the parties that mediation has failed then for "thirty days ...
no changes shall be made in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established
practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose." Section 160 provides that from
the time the emergency board is created until thirty days after the board makes its
report to the President, "no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties
to the controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose." See Comment,
Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining theStatus Quo in Railway Labor Disputes, 60
COLUM. L. Rev. 381, 388 (1960). See also MacIntyre, The Railway Labor Act A Misfit for the Airlines. 19 J. Ant L. & CoM. 274, 278-81 (1952), for a criticism of
the inequalities and lack of clarity of the phraseology of these "cooling off" provisions.
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 107. 108 (1964).
34. See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61,
63-64, 66 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936 (1962); Railroad Yardmasters
v. Pennsylvania R.R.. 224 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1955). For specific situations in which
carriers and unions have been enjoined for violating the status quo in major disputes
see Harper, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AmR L. & CoM.
3, 9 (1969).
35. Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1964).
36. Id.at 34. Although § 6 refers only to carriers, "[t]he legislative history
indicates that when the rail unions and carriers agreed upon these provisions, the
unions surrendered their right to strike pending exhaustion of major dispute procedures in exchange for a statutory provision restraining management from disturbing
the status quo." Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21, 43
(2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion). In American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l, 169 F. Supp. 777, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), the court concluded after a review
of the legislative history that the freeze Vrovisions of the Act including § 6 apply to
both unions and carriers and "the parties .-.-.v not, in the course of a major dispute
under the Railway Labor Act, have resort to either the strike or lockout before the
procedures provided for by the Act have been exhausted and a strike or lockout during
that period is illegal and forbidden by the Act." The view in American that the
freeze provisions apply to both the carrier and the union is the one followed by most
courts. See, e.g., Missouri-Ill. R.R. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 322 F.2d 793, 796
(8th Cir. 1963). But see Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status
Quo, 60 COLUM. L. Rtv. 381, 389 n.51 (1960), where it is suggested that the union
may strike even without having exhausted the procedures under the Act. The commentator reasons that American "did not consider the fact that § 6 applies only to
carriers and the sections that could be applied to unions only operate after the conciliatory and mediatory proceedings have failed and the procedures for bringing public
opinion to bear on the problem have been initiated." But it would seem that to con-
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of a major dispute resort to either the strike or lockout by the parties 7
is prohibited by the terms of the RLA.3 Indeed, it has been consistently held that no self-help is permitted while negotiations continue
or the Mediation Board has jurisdiction. 9 Furthermore, "conduct of
both parties in derogation of the major dispute procedures must be
enjoined [since] the cooling-off policies of the major dispute procedures cannot be effectuated by allowing both parties simply to do away
with the Act."' 40 Resort to the courts, therefore, to facilitate compliance with the Act's procedures is considered preferable to the use of
self-help."
However, the RLA does not contemplate a total ban on self-help.
"[C] ompulsions go only to insure that those procedures are exhausted
before resort can be had to self-help." 42 While arbitration is not mandatory in major disputes, there is a statutory duty to exhaust the available remedies. But after these procedures have been observed without
reaching a settlement, the Act gives no indication of what is to take
place. As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated though, "[i] mplicit
in the statutory scheme

. . .

is the ultimate right of the disputants to

resort to self-help." 4 Thus, the parties may employ the pressures of
the strike and lockout at the termination of the procedural process of
the RLA. The use of these economic weapons has been phrased by
one court as ".

.

. the inevitable alternative in a statutory scheme which

deliberately denies the final power to compel aribitration. ' ' 44 It would

strue § 6 as applying only to carriers would serve only to frustrate the purposes of
the RLA since a strike would undoubtedly upset the status quo and cause interruptions to commerce.
37.
The status quo provisions of the Railway Labor Act refer to the "representatives of the employees," & 6, or the "parties to the controversy," § 10 so that
it is conceivable that only Union-sponsored strikes violate the Act. Such a literal
analysis has not been applied, however, in construing other aspects of the Railway
Labor Act, see, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River and
Indiana R. Co.. 1957, 353 U.S. 30, 77 S. Ct. 635, 1 L. Ed. 2d 622, and it would
hardly serve the purpose of the Act to hold that wildcat strikes, such as the strike
involved here, did not come within the statutory ban on self-help. Moreover, it
should be noted that § 2 of the Act provides that "it shall be the duty of . . .
employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements ...
and to settle all disputes . . . in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or
to the operation of any carrier ...
"
National Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 416 F.2d 998, 1003 n.3
(5th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 169 F. Supp.
777, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
39. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 378 (1969) ; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B.R.R., 385 F.2d
581, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1967); American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l,
169 F. Supp. 777, 788-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See generally Harper, Major Disputes
Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. Am L. & CoM. 3, 5-10 (1969).
40. Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21, 45 (2d Cir.
1962) (dissenting opinion).
41. Id. Cf. Bakery Sales Drivers Local 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948)-;
Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926). But see Maestro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270 (1956).
42. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945).
43. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
378 (1969).
44. Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172, 181 (5th
Cir. 1964). The court declared that when the machinery of industrial peace fails, the
policy in national labor legislation is to let loose the full economic power of the dis-
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seem that a contrary conclusion would serve only to frustrate the RLA's
overall blueprint for the settlement of major disputes. 45
Thus the general trend of authority has been to permit self-help
in major disputes by both the union4 6 and the carrier 47 when the RLA
procedures have been exhausted and to enjoin the carrier or the union
when either attempts to alter the status quo while the machinery of
the Act is still in progress. It appears that no court had, prior to
National, sanctioned the use of self-help by the carrier before the exhaustion of its procedural remedies. But the trend of several recent
cases48 concerning the appropriate use of self-help has culminated in
the decision in National that under certain circumstances a carrier
under the RLA may resort to self-help notwithstanding that the statutory major dispute procedures have not been concluded.
In FloridaEast Coast Railway v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,49 an unusual and complicated set of circumstances gave rise to
the employment of self-help by the carrier.5" Certain employees of the
railroad went on strike over a wage demand after the procedures under
section 6 had been exhausted. The Trainmen's Union honored the
picket lines of the strikers and refused to report to work. To continue
operations, the railroad replaced the Trainmen Union employees with
workers who were hired under conditions of employment that differed
from the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement. Later, the railroad served a section 6 notice which sought to amend the original collective bargaining agreement so that it would substantially conform
with the agreement under which the replacement workers were hired.5"
The court held that the railroad violated the RLA by its unilateral
abrogation of the existing collective bargaining agreement. But it
viewed the major problem as one of "what the law permits when the
protagonists have exhausted all of the elaborate governmental machinery for the settlement of a dispute, and neither is willing to
budge."'52 Keeping in mind the Act's primary purpose of preventing
putants. "On the side of labor, it is the cherished right to strike. On management,

the right to operate, or at least the right to try to operate." Id.
45. See Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238
(1966); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 372 U.S.
284
(1963); Order of R.Rt Telegraphers v. Chicago N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960);
Elgin, J. & E. R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945). Since the act contemplates and
permits the disputants to engage in self-help, the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act prevents the issuance of an injunction to prevent such resort. See Harper, Major
Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J.AiR L. & CoM. 3, 7 (1969).
46. See, e.g., Elgin, J. & E. R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
47. See Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S.

238 (1966) ; Brotherhood of RLtR Trainmen v. Florida E.C. Ry., 336 F.2d 172 (5th
Cir. 1964).
48. See note 46 supra. See also United Indus. Workers v. Board of Trustees,
400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1968).
49. 336 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964).
50. The court stated "it is equally clear that if this were the ordinary situation
of a Carrier not faced with 'strike conditions,' the institution of wholesale changes
of the sort here involved would be enjoinable by the District Court ... ." Id. at 179.
51. The court felt that bargaining would become a "sham if a Carrier has already
done in fact what is formally seeks to do in negotiation of a § 6 notice." Id. at 180.
The fact that the changes in actual operation were instituted prior to the § 6 notice
would not alter the situation and make them proper.
52. Id.
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interruptions to commerce, the court therefore ruled that the railroad
could unilaterally institute such changes 58 as the district court found
to be "reasonably necessary to effectuate' 54 its right to continue to run
its railroad under the strike conditions.

Following the rationale of Trainmen, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of a carrier to institute self-help in Brotherhood of
Railway & Steamship Clerks v. FloridaEast Coast Railway.55 In this
case, the dispute centered over a wage increase and the amount of
advance notice for impending layoffs and job abolitions. When the
procedures of section 6 had run their course without resolving the conflict, a lawful strike by the union followed. The district court ,then
allowed the railroad to institute certain changes in its operations which
were contrary to the existing collective bargaining agreement.5 6 The
Supreme Court approved these alterations by the carrier, stressing that
the carrier's right of self-help subsequent to the exhaustion of the
statutory procedures was underlined by the public service aspects of
its business. 57 To require each change that the carrier institutes, the
Court reasoned, to run the same gauntlet of negotiation and mediation
as did the notice and pay provisions that gave rise to the strike would
have the practical effect of bringing the railroad to a grinding halt.
Furthermore, the Court recognized that when a carrier is compelled
to employ an emergency labor force, "it may or may not be able to
comply with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, drafted
to meet the sophisticated requirements of a trained and professional
labor force. ' 58 But, although the carrier could resort to self-help, the
53. In discussing these changes made by the carrier the court said:
But this right of self-help is not a license for the wholesale abrogation of the
agreement. As the term implies, it is help which is reasonably needed to meet
the impasse of a railroad desiring to run and unions unwilling to furnish workers.

Id. at 181.

54. Id. at 182. It is true that the procedures had not been exhausted under the
second § 6 notice. But the carrier's right to self-help stemmed from the first § 6 notice,
under which the procedures had been exhausted and "strike conditions" were in effect.
Thus, the question became whether the carrier could resort to self-help after the union
had resorted to a strike even though another § 6 notice had been exchanged which
covered the changes the carrier had already instituted as its form of self-help. Whether
there was an actual "strike" by the Trainmen Union is discussed at 179 n.22.
55. 384 U.S. 238 (1966).
56. The court permitted the FEC to exceed the ratio of apprentices to journeymen and age limitations established by the collective bargaining agreements, to contract
out certain work, and to use supervisory personnel to perform specified jobs where it
appeared that trained personnel were unavailable. Several other FEC requests were
denied. Subsequently, both sides appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed on the
basis of its decision in Trainmen. Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States, 348 F.2d 682
(5th Cir. 1965).
57. "More is involved than the settlement of a private controversy without appreciable consequences to the public." 384 U.S. at 244, citing Virginian Ry. v. Federation,
300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
58. 384 U.S. at 246. The Court went on to say that the Union remained the
bargaining agent for both its members and the replacement employees and that the
replacement workers were entitled to all the benefits of the prior collective bargaining
agreements. But, the Court concluded, "when a strike occurs, both the carrier's right
of self-help and its duty to operate, if reasonably possible, might well be academic if
it could not depart from the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement without first following the lengthy course the Act otherwise prescribes." Id.
But realizing that a carrier might use the occasion of a strike to institute wholesale
changes in the collective bargaining agreement, the Court carefully circumscribed the
measures a carrier was permitted to employ.
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Court permitted only those changes that were "reasonably necessary",
(using the term in its strictest sense) to continue operations.
In both Trainmen and Railway Clerks, lawful "strike conditions"
were in existence which were precipitated by the failure of the major
dispute provisions to produce a settlement. Thus, before the carrier
was permitted to resort to self-help, the Act's major dispute provisions
had been exhausted and the union had already engaged in self-help
itself. More important, both cases emphasize the carrier's right and
duty to continue its operations and, if interpreted broadly, suggest that
under certain conditions that right and duty may outweigh the mandate of the RLA that the statutory procedures must be exhausted before the carrier can resort to self-help.
It has been indicated by the fifth circuit in a prior case that a
union may similarly be able to resort to self-help under the RLA prior
to the exhaustion of remedies. In United Industrial Workers of Seafarers v. Board of Trustees,5 9 the carrier unilaterally changed working
conditions by consumating a lease of its elevator facilities in violation
of the status quo provisions of section 6, resulting in the layoff of
thirty-four workers. The union members then picketed, but were enjoined by the state court. Thereafter, the district court issued an
injunction enjoining the carrier from availing itself of the state court
injunction. The fifth circuit affirmed, stating that if the union is to be
enjoined from picketing in the future, it must be enjoined under the
RLA and not under a state statute; and it must be enjoined in a
federal, not state, court. In its discussion of section 6, the court stated
that at the time the state court injunction was issued, the carrier itself
was -in violation of the Act and "[t] he cases suggest that at that time,
under the Act, the Union had the right to strike; that right continues
until the Act is complied with by the Carrier, and thereafter ceases
during and until exhaustion of the procedures set up by the Act." 60
Furthermore, the court noted that "[i]f the carrier refuses to follow
the procedures of the Act, or if those procedures are followed to an
impasse, the Union may strike."'" Apparently the only obligation on
the part of the union before it may strike if the carrier is in noncompliance with the Act is that it must do everything it can to exhaust
all the procedures of the Act. The court reasoned that "[t]he Union's
right to bargain, guaranteed by the Act ... and presently enforced by

this Court, would be illusory without a right to strike when bargaining
has run its course if the Carrier continues to refuse to bargain."6 2
Although the rationale of United Industrial Workers relating to
self-help is but dictum, it nevertheless lends support to the conclusion
arrived at in National. The United Industrial Workers court recognized that the right to strike prior to the exhaustion of remedies under
59. 400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1968).
60. Id. at 332-33. See Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959) ; Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 877 (1957).
61. 400 F.2d at 334.
62. Id.
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the RLA might become necessary if the carrier refused to bargain.3
National presents the same situation in reverse. There the carrier
was seeking self-help because the Union members had refused to bargain. In both cases, the parties seeking self-help did everything
possible to exhaust the procedures of the Act, and as the court held in
United Industrial Workers, that is all that is necessary.
While it is true that National had first breached the status quo64
by reducing the taxi crew from three to two men, 65 it did return to
the status quo ante immediately after the first order by the district
court. But during the time of the breach, the strikers were nonetheless in violation of the Act by engaging in retaliatory self-help against
the carrier.6 6 The proper remedy for the strikers would have been a
request for equitable relief from the courts 6 7 to enjoin the carrier from
altering the number of men in the taxi crew from three to two. This
was the remedy the union followed, but apparently such action did not
appease the strikers. Thereafter, when National returned to the status
quo ante in compliance with the order, it resumed an accord with the
procedures of the Act. At this point, there was no justification whatsoever for any judicial relief much less self-help against the airlines.
63. Id. at 333.
64. One problem left open by the court is that no effect was given to the airline's

original order to reduce the taxi crew from three to two workmen. While there may
have been other labor problems between National and the union (although none are
given), it was this order which precipitated the suspension of the three workers, the
subsequent wildcat strike, and the discharge of the strikers. It should be pointed out
that the district court later sustained the union's position and ruled that National had
violated the status quo. See note 9 supra. Thus, National, the party originally at fault
but later in compliance, was allowed to resort to self-help despite its original effort
to change the status quo. The fifth circuit, however, did not consider the equitable
doctrine of unclean hands or the statutory enactment of that doctrine in § 8 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964), since the issue was not presented by
the union as a basis for denying injunctive relief in regard to the initial injunction.
Nevertheless, the court did note that while National's conduct may have barred the
initial injunction, it would not have barred the second injunction against the strikers
since National had complied with the restraining order and resumed the status quo
ante. Thus because of this action to restore the status quo, it could be contended that
National did have "clean hands" when it applied for the second injunction. See
National Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 416 F.2d 998, 1003 n.4
(5th Cir. 1969) ; United Indus. Workers of Seafarers v. Board of Trustees, 400 F.2d
320, 332-34 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs,
362 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 268 F.2d 54, 60 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959). See also
Harper, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AIR L. & Com. 3 (1969),
for a discussion of when an injunction may issue under the RLA. See generally
Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rrv. 292 (1963). Consider also that the "lack of clean hands" has been viewed by some courts as merely
one of several factors to consider in granting injunctive relief and is not by itself an
absolute ban to such relief. See Brotherhood of R.R, Trainmen v. Akron & B.B.R.R.,
385 F.2d 581, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 68 L.R.R.M. 2817 (7th Cir. 1968).
65. The carrier claimed that this change constituted only a minor dispute and
therefore did not violate the status quo. The court rejected this argument observing
that the discharge occurred after the exchange of § 6 notices during a "freeze" period
when self-help is ordinarily unlawful. Moreover, the court acknowledged that this
would be true even if the change in taxi crews constituted a minor dispute. Cf.
Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966).
In other contexts, a district court may qualify an injunction with conditions in accord
with traditional equitable considerations. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v.
Missouri-K.-T.R.R., 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
66. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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The continuance of the wildcat strike subsequent to National's
resumption of the status quo ante seems clearly a violation of the Act,"s
especially if the reasoning in United Industrial Workers is followed."9
Furthermore, a broad reading of United Industrial Workers might
even suggest that National could have instituted self-help immediately
after it returned to the status quo ante. But at this stage, it would
seem that recourse to self-help would not be justified and that resort
to the courts would be preferable. To allow self-help here before the
courts have had an opportunity to correct the situation would be, as
one court has stated, "allowing both parties simply to do away with
the Act."7 In this respect, the United Industrial Workers reasoning
of allowing a party recourse to self-help when the other party is in
non-compliance with the Act would seem to completely vitiate the
RLA's scheme for settlement.
In National, however, the carrier first sought its proper remedy
in the courts, and even when this proved ineffective, it returned to
the courts for additional assistance, which again proved inadequate.
At this juncture, the carrier was confronted with a perplexing dilemma.
It had already cancelled thirty-six flights as a result of the strike and
was faced with the probability of further cancellations unless it could
resume its normal operations. Thus, under the burden of this interruption in its service by wildcat strikers who refused to maintain the
status quo and who openly defied the carrier, the union and the courts,
National, having done all it could to restore the status quo, resorted
to self-help, dismissing the strikers who did not return to work as was
ordered by the district court in its second order. 7'
By allowing National to resort to self-help prior to the exhaustion of the RLA's statutory procedures, the decision of the fifth circuit
seems to break tradition with previous cases. But when read in the
context of the purposes of the RLA, the result is in harmony with
the Act's policy of continuing service to the public, maintaining commerce and preventing interruptions thereto. Moreover, it must be
stressed that the dismissal was permitted only after several remedies
had been tried without success and alternate remedies seemed inade68. Cf. NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 1944), where the court
said in regard to a wildcat strike in violation of the NLRA:
When the union was selected by the employees and recognized by the company
as bargaining agent, it was understood and agreed on all sides that bargaining
with respect to wages, hours and conditions of work would be carried on between
the union and the company in accordance with the above quoted statutory provision, that the employees would acquiesce in action taken by the union and that
they would not undertake independent action with respect to the matters they
had committed to it as their authorized agency. Not only did the company agree
to bargain only with the union, but the employees agreed to bargain only through
the union. Those who engaged in the "wildcat strike" violated this agreement.
69. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
70. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
71. The second order issued by the district court instructed the union to "advise
the membership that it is the order of the Court and of the defendant IAM that all
men return to work by their next shift, and that individuals who refuse to so report
are subject to penalties which could include dismissal by NATIONAL AIRLINES."
416 F.2d at 1001. In other contexts it has been held that a district court may qualify
an injunction with conditions in accord with traditional equitable considerations.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-K.-T.R.R., 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
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quate. 2 In other words, as the court stated, "an unmanageable work
stoppage" had resulted. While the court did not explicitly so state,
it also seemed to be influenced by the danger of a crippling effect to
the airline because of the strike. Since airlines deal in services, and
7
not goods, they cannot prepare for a strike by building up inventory.
Moreover, the great cost of operation for the airlines as opposed to
dwindling profits, could result in a financial disaster to an airline faced
with strike conditions. 74 These factors, coupled with the immediate
effect on the public as evidenced by the inconvenience to the passengers of the thirty-six flights, appears to have weighed heavily in the
court's consideration. When viewed in the light of these compelling
circumstances, the fifth circuit's decision amounts to no more than an
attempt to regain the status quo ante by allowing National to replace
the strikers so that it could continue its operations and prevent any
commercial interruption.
Although the court did grant self-help prior to the exhaustion of
remedies, it did so reluctantly and only after it carefully circumscribed
its employment. It strictly limited self-help to the extent necessary
to restore service regardless of whether recourse to such action was
precipitated by a lawful or unlawful strike.7 5 "[I]ts exercise was
allowable only so far as it served that end."'7 Thus while it viewed
replacement of the strikers as a reasonably necessary step to restore
service, it frowned upon the mass discharge of the strikers, viewing
such action as incompatible with the policy of the RLA.
It might be contended that National could open up a Pandora's
box in the area of major disputes, causing a frustration of the Act's
purposes by allowing self-help prior to the exhaustion of the RLA's
procedural process; this result, however, does not seem likely. It
must be stressed that the purpose of the RLA is not to establish and
enforce inflexible standards but rather to promote commerce and
establish a degree of harmony between the carriers and the unions
in the transportation industry. It would seem then that the policy
72. Further injunctive relief at this stage would seem futile. Since the strikers
had not obeyed the prior injunctions, there was no reason to expect them to comply
with any new ones. Contempt citations or fines would also appear ineffective. The
efficacy of such measures had greatly diminished once the union had lost control of
the workers. Possibly, however, the carrier should have returned to the court for
further instruction before discharging the strikers. But, then again, the court's actions
had proved unsuccessful twice before and time was becoming critical to the carrier.

73. See Wisehart, The Airlines' Recent Experience Under the Railway Labor
Act, 25 LAW & CONTtMP. PROB. 22 (1960).
74. Id.
75. In Trainmen and Railway Clerks the carrier was confronted with a lawful
strike whereas here the strike is unlawful. It might be contended that need for
self-help is greater where the strike is unlawful and thus usually less subject to judicial,
union or other control. But, the court felt that whether lawful or unlawful, restraint
in the use of self-help is the best policy. See Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and
"Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNSLL L.Q. 672
(1967), for a discussion of approaches taken by the NLRB and several circuit courts
in handling wildcat strikes.
76. 416 F.2d at 1006. The question of what is reasonably necessary is primarily

one to be left to the discretion of the district judge. See Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172, 182 (1964).
77. Discharge would eliminate those workers best suited to carry on National's
business as well as preventing the possible restoration of the status quo should the
strikers choose to return to work before enough replacements were hired.
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of the Act would be curtailed more by allowing wildcat strikers to
openly repudiate the machinery of the RLA causing a cessation of
airline service than to allow a carrier the right to institute self-help
to restore flight operations. The fifth circuit's decision that National's
recourse to self-help was not prohibited by the Act seems in accord
with Trainmen and Railway Clerks for, as in those cases, resort to
self-help was permitted when, and only when, all other remedies had
failed to bring one of the disputants into compliance with the Act's procedures, and existed only to the extent necessary to continue operations.

